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as that of its opponent doctrine, and its logic seems more cogent. Nor is
comparative negligence a quixotic-dash at the windmills while the barons
wait in the wings to tear down the already atrophied citadel of fault. Com-
parative negligence comprehends fault and compensation, and substantial
case law has already interpreted the many facets of this paralleled dichotomy.
It represents a sensible compromise precipitated by a change in conditions,
particularly the carnage that takes place on our highways each year. There
seems to be no reason why, if the courts forget their regenerative function,
lawyers should feel compelled into meek compliance. There is nothing
sacrosanct about the doctrine of contributory negligence and the long line of
precedent which have found it controlling, nor is there anything sagacious
in the "logic" or the historical "motives" from which it emerged.
Seymour Mansfield
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: STRICT LIABILITY AND THE DEFENSES
One area of the law which probably was not a part of the reader's
law school curriculum and still has not been incorporated in any meaning-
ful way into most programs of legal study is the theory of strict products
liability which emerged just a little over five years ago. The purpose of
this writing is to provide an insight and orientation into the elements of
the plaintiff's proof as well as the defenses available, with particular em-
phasis on the defense of contributory fault (or, if you prefer, "assumption
of risk"). In order to better understand some of the distinctions between
the theory of strict liability and the traditional remedies of "warranty"
and "negligence," the historical approach is used to draw comparison.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Prior to the birth of the doctrine of strict liability, the chief avenues to
recovery for products liability were actions based either on breach of
warranty, or negligence. Actions for breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty for partic-
ular purpose and for negligence could co-exist in a single complaint. All
of these remedies shared at least one thing in common: their inadequacy.
In the 'ex contractu' actions (grounded in breach of warranty) recovery
might be precluded by defenses that there had been no "reliance" on the
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warranty.1that the plaintiff failed to comply with certain "notice" require-
ments,2 that the defendant had "disclaimed" responsibility for such injuries
as the plaintiff sustained,8 or that the parties were not in "privity" with
each other. 4 The defense of "privity" proved to be the most obnoxious of
these obstacles and gave legal writers their foothold for attack. Too often,
the injured plaintiff was not privity privileged and went uncompensated.
Of this privity wall Professor Prosser said:
It is true that against the retailer, the consumer who buys for himself and is
injured can rely, in all but a few states, (citations omitted) upon the old sales
warranties of merchantable quality and fitness for the purpose. But so long as
the privity wall stands firm, these warranties are of no avail against the whole-
saler; nor do they protect the buyer's wife or child, his employee, his guest,
his donee, or his sub-purchaser. The result has been such utterly preposterous
decisions as those holding that the wife who buys the sausage, handles it, cooks
it, eats it, and is poisoned by it, cannot recover because she was merely buying
as the agent of her husband, who was to pay the bill and so is regarded as the
contracting party; whereas the husband, who never saw the food, can recover on
a warranty for the loss of her services.5
This chronic preoccupation with privity eventually led to some specific
provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code6 which extended the retailer's
warranty to the members of the buyer's household, but even this extension
did not include the most likely users in the case of a multitude of products.
So enamoured with the rule of privity were the courts that they extended
it to actions of negligence somewhat obtrusely in the famous (or infamous)
Winterbottom rationale. 7 At the time of this decision, modern industrialism
was virtually unknown, and the holding in Winterbottom seemed consistent
with the times. Then came the industrial revolution, and in 1916 Judge
Cardozo rejected the application of the Winterbottom rationale in tort ac-
tions noting:
The dealer was indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some
approach to certainty, that by him the car would not be used. Yet the defendant
1Beckett v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 376 Ill. 470, 34 N.E.2d 427 (1941) (express war-
ranty).
2 See generally, 6 A.L.R.3d 1371, as to the requirement of giving notice to the defendant
with respect to a personal injury claim based on the theory of breach of warranty.
3 Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958).
4 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842); Paul Harris
Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 11. 2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1956) (express warranty).
5 Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1117 (1960).
6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, amending UNI'ORM SALES ACT § 15 (1), (2).
7 Supra note 4, Lord Abinger laid down his dicta concerning the non-liability of a
manufacturer for negligence in a breach of contract case.
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would have us say that he was the one person whom it was under a legal duty to
protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclusion. 8
The decision was immediately accepted" and after some 42 years is the uni-
versal law of the land.' 0
With the duty of care elevated to normal and extending to anyone who
may reasonably be expected to be in the probable use of the chattel," the
plaintiff's task was reduced to showing that the injury was proximately
caused by the defendant's "defective" product and that the defendant was
negligent.' 2 Although the plaintiff will seldom, if ever, have any direct evi-
dence of the defendant's negligence, he is aided in most jurisdictions by
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 13 and in the few remaining jurisdictions by
theories of misrepresentation 14 or theories equivalent to res ipsa loquitur.
15
In all jurisdictions then, the plaintiff has some means of reaching the jury.
Add to this, the factor of human nature and in all probability the plaintiff
will carry the day.
Well then, if negligence is such a good remedy, why all the clamor about
strict liability? In response to this query, Dean Prosser submits:
There are other sellers than the manufacturer of the product. It will pass
through the hands of a whole line of other dealers, and the plaintiff may have
good reason to sue any or all of them. The manufacturer is often beyond the
jurisdiction. He may even, in some cases, be unknown. If he is identified and can
be sued, it is very often impossible to pin the liability upon him. Even where
there is a proved defect which speaks of obvious negligence on the part of some-
one, it is very often impossible to prove that it was on the part of the maker.
The cracked Coca-Cola bottle may have been cracked long after it left his plant.
And even when the cause can be fixed upon the manufacturer, he may turn out,
in these days of chain stores and large supply houses, to be a small concern,
operating on a shoestring, and financially the least responsible person in the whole
chain of distribution. If the plaintiff is to recover at all, he must often look to
the wholesaler, the jobber, and the retailer.
8 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 391, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
9 Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than Their Immediate Vendees,
45 L.Q. Rlv. 343 (1929).
10 See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 661 (3d ed. 1964).
11 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395.
12 See HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1961).
13 See, e.g., Duval v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Ill. App. 290, 68 N.E.2d 479 (1946);
HuRsH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2:119 (1961); Prosser, The Assault
upon the Citadel, 69 YAI. L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960).
14Economy Hog & Cattle Powder Co. v. Compton, 192 Ind. 222, 135 N.E. 1 (1922);
Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. Willis, 219 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
15 Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953); Merchant v. Columbia Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 214 S.C. 206, 51 S.E.2d 749 (1949).
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It is here that negligence liability breaks down. The wholesaler, the jobber, and
the retailer normally are simply not negligent. They are under no duty to test or
inspect the chattel, and they do not do so; and when, as is usually the case today,
it comes to them in a sealed container, examination becomes impossible without
destroying marketability. No inference of negligence can arise against these sellers,
and res ipsa loquitur is of no use at all. 16
And Chief Justice Traynor submits:
The injury from a defective product does not become a matter of indifference
because the defect arises from causes other than the negligence of the manufac-
turer, such as negligence of a submanufacturer of a component part whose defects
could not be revealed by inspections ... or unknown causes that even by the
device of res ipsa loquitur cannot be classified as negligence of the manufacturer.
The inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper
care.
17
Throughout the period while the plaintiffs were wrestling with the
problems inherent in the warranty and negligence actions, there developed
a rather distinct body of case law commonly known as the "food cases." The
American decisions can be traced to the year 1815 when a New York court
imposed strict liability on the seller of food running to the purchaser via
a special "warranty!' peculiar to food. 18 But the requirement of privity still
remained and the line of decisions which followed did little to lift this
scourge.19 Then in 1913, as a result of national agitation over defective
food,20 the concept of strict liability in food cases was extended to the
"ultimate consumer" and the wall of privity was breached at last.21
By applying the device of strict liability in the food cases (which were
grounded in the remedy of "warranty" and therefor within the family of
ex contractu actions) the courts actually created a hybrid remedy which had
some characteristics of tort and others of contract. For a long time thereafter
it appeared as though no one really minded the confusion, and the label of
16SuPrya note 5, at 1116.
17 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
18 Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns 468, 7 Am. Dec. 339 (N.Y. 1815).
19 Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410, 118 N.E. 853 (1918). See Heinemann v. Barfield, 136
Ark. 500, 207 S.W. 62 (1918) ; Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 51 (1869); Bark v. Dixon,
115 Minn. 172, 131 N.W. 1078 (1911).
20 Narrated in Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROD. 3 (1933).
21 Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1933). The majority, including
Illinois, followed: Tiffin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d
406 (1913); Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943);
Blarjeske v. Thompson's Restaurant Co., 325 Ill. App. 189, 59 N.E.2d 320 (1945); Pa-
targias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947) ; Heimsoth v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 1 Ill. App. 2d 28, 116 N.E.2d 193 (1953).
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"warranty" iingered on tifitil the Yrar 1955 Whefi Pfbf ssr& Piosser suggested
thfowing the iimitation t6 food onto the ash pile and to "impose strict lia-
bility outright in tort, as a pure matter of public poiicy. '22 (emphasis sup-
plied)
Aside from the somewhat academic question of whether the liability was
one of tort or one of contract there existed the problem of extending the
concept of strict liability to products other than food. Some courts quickly
applied the logic of the "food cases" to situations involving articles for in-
timate bodily use such as hair dye2s and soap.24 Then in 1960 the land-
mark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors25 extended that special
hybrid of strict liability to other products generally. The case involved a
runaway Chrysler automobile which, because of a defective steering gear,
crashed at a right angle into a wall. The action, sounding in warranty, was
brought against the retailer and the manufacturer in the theory of strict
liability and the court held:
[T]he burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is boine by
those who are in a position to either control the danger or make an equitable
distribution of the losses when they do occur .... 26
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly in a bottle
of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome beverage may bring ill-
ness to one person, the defective car, with its great potentiality for harm to the
driver, occupants, and others, demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier
of privity.27
Accordingly, we hold that under modern marketing conditions, When a manu-
facturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase
by the public, an implied warranty that it is ieasonably Suitable for use as such
accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. Absence of agency be-
tween the manufacturer and the dealer who makes the ultimate sale is immaterial.28
22 PROSSER, TORTS § 84, (2d ed. 1955). The only juidicIal authority expressly supporting
such a position was the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Traynor in the celebrated
case, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottlinig Co. Chief Justice Traynor therein stated: "In my
opinion it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability
when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings. . . .Even if there
is no negligence . . .public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it Will
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that
reach the market." Supra note 17 at 440, 461.
23 Graham v. Bottomfield's Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954).
24 Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
25 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
261d. at 379, 161 A.2d at 81.
27 Id. at 383, 161 A.2d at 83.
28 1d: at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
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Although Henningsen served to carry over the concept of strict liability
to products other than food, it did not deal with the problem of the peculiar
characteristics of tort, but rather of contract under the guise of "implied
warranty." No one doubted that in the absence of privity the liability was,
in substance, tort and not contract.
The transition from this point was rapid. Chief Justice Traynor, one of
the most noteworthy and convincing advocates of strict liability, transformed
the doctrine into one of pure tort just two years after Henningsen in the
celebrated Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. decision.29 That case
involved a defective power tool which let fly a piece of wood. The defendant
manufacturer defended upon the ground that "notice" of the breach, as
required by the Uniform Sales Act, had not been given. In his majority
opinion, Chief Justice Traynor reiterated his reasons for favoring a doctrine
of strict liability in tort, and his opinion received the unanimous concur-
rence of the other members of the court. The purpose of imposing strict
liability in the Greenman case was to insure that the burdens of injury
resulting from defective products are shouldered by the parties who put
the product on the market rather than upon the injured consumer who can
ill afford such a risk.
Within months the doctrine received approval in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, Section 402A, (of which Professor Prosser was the reporter and
chief justice Traynor one of the advisors) approved by the American Law In-
stitute in 1964, adopted 1965;
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.80 (emphasis added).
29 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
.30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. Comment m, makes it clear that the
nature of the liability is one of tort: "The rule stated in this Section does not require
any reliance on the part of the consumer upon the reputation, skill, or judgment of the
seller who is to be held liable, nor any representation or undertaking on the part of that
seller .... The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uni-
form Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and is
not affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties. . . .Nor is a
consumer required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time
[Vol. XVIII
The Illinois landmark case, Suvada v. White Motor Co.,31 was decided in
1965 and involved a set of faulty brakes which unleashed the plaintiff's
vehicle into a bus and provided the opportunity for the Illinois Supreme Court
to adopt the Greenman-Restatement approach. In a voice which sounded
not unlike the echo of Chief Justice Traynor, Justice House said:
[P]ublic interest in human life and health, the invitation and solicitations to
purchase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the
risk and reaping the profit are present and as compelling in cases involving motor
vehicles and other products, where the defective condition makes them unreason-
ably dangerous to the user, as they are in food cases.3 2
Then the court expressly and significantly noted that its views "coincide
with the position taken in Section 402A American Law Institute's revised
Restatement of Torts approved in May, 1964.
'
"33
At the time of this writing the principles enunciated in the Greenman
case and in section 402A have been followed or expanded in seventeen
jurisdictions.84 No other field of law has witnessed such a rapid progression.
Truly, Professor Prosser and Chief Justice Traynor have had a profound
impact on social change.
The arguments advanced to support strict liability in its present form
emphasize that there is something wrong, if not in the manufacturer's manner
of production, or the retailer's manner of selling, at least in their product.
It is argued that the injured user is the least able to bear the loss and that,
conversely, the manufacturer or retailer is able to bear the loss or shift the
risk, by means of insurance, the cost of which will be passed on to the con-
sumer (maybe). Furthermore, it is posited that the "fault principle" is
primitive and out of step in this generation and simply that "the public in-
terest in human life, health and safety demands the maximum possible
protection that the law can give against dangerous products which con-
sumers must buy, and against which they are helpless to protect them-
selves."135 In Comment (c) following 402A, the justifications for imposing
strict liability are said to be:
after it occurs. . . .The consumer's cause of action ...is not affected by any dis-
claimer or other agreement. . . .In short, "warranty" must be given a new and dif-
ferent meaning if it is used in connection with this Section. It is much simpler to
regard the liability here stated as merely one of strict liability in tort."
8132 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
3 2 Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
33 Id. at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187.
84 For citations refer to AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, and PRODUCTS LIABIL-
rTY REPORTER (C.C.H. 1965).
85PROSSER, supra note 10; and, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960).
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[T]hat the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in
the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the
seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy de-
mands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for
consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost
of production against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the con-
sumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands
of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who market the
products.
In short, the advocacy on behalf of strict liability boils down to an attempt
to comply with the moral judgment of society, that a small loss to many is
better and more just than a catastrophic loss to a very few. Some writers
argue that the doctrine amounts to nothing more than "'enterprise liability"
or "products compensation" and is just another step down the road to col-
lectivism and socialism." A careful analysis would indicate that the change
is one only of theory rather than results. Instead of abortively circumvent-
ing the "warranty" and "negligence" structures, (e.g., by the use of such
devices as res ipsa loquitur, ultrahazardous activity giving rise to absolute
liability, negligence per se, misrepresentation, deceit, implied warranty,
nuisance, and absurd agency inventions) the court can reach the same
result in a much more direct way. The simplicity of the theory may well
make products litigation less complicated, less costly, and certainly more
realistic. The plaintiff still has the burden of showing that the product is
defective and unreasonably dangerous, that it was in this condition when
it left the control of the defendant, and that it proximately caused the plain-
tiff's injury 7 Thus the defendant is not the. insurer against any injury
caused by any of his products.
In enunciating the concept of strict liability, the courts have served at least two
venerable and traditional ends. They have stripped away the vestigal remnants
which rendered the warranty action so cumbersome and inadequate and restored
simplicity and attention to substance (rather than form) in the field of products
liability. They have also reminded American industry of its traditional quest for
excellence and workmanship, and of its inescapable responsibility for providing
56 See, e.g., Smyser, Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A Petition
for Rehearing, 42 U. DET. L.J. 343 (1965).
37 Note that injury plus causality will not equal liability in the absence of a "defect,"
even though the product by its very nature might be inherently dangerous. Thus while
the bottling company would be liable for the decomposing mouse found in the bottle,
it would not be liable for the harm to the consumer's teeth which might result from the
sugar contained in the beverage. A dart manufacturer would not be liable when the user
put out another's eye in the use of the product in the absence of some particular defect
of the dart to which the injury was attributable.
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thase. Despite the alarms, a manufacturer or merchandiser still has a complete
defense to an action in strict liability: a product free from defects. 88
THE DEFENSES
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The plaintiff in a strict products liability case is required to prove that
the defective, unreasonably dangerous condition in the defendant's product
was the "proximate cause" of his injury. This requirement of proof has been
recognized in 402A of the Restatement and almost universally in decisions
to date.3 9 While proximate cause is not, strictly speaking, an affirmative
defense, courts have confused it with the various affirmative defenses. For
example, in those cases where misuse or contributory negligence is a defense,
the court might say that the defendant's conduct is not the proximate cause
of the harm suffered because the plaintiff's act has intervened. 40 The courts
may couch their decision in terms of proximate cause rather than the
particular affirmative defense available in order to avoid a determination on
the issue of whether that particular affirmative defense is in fact available
to the defendant. This evasion is especially attractive in deciding cases
under the theory of strict products liability which is still young in ternis of
definitive case law and where the question of which defenses are in fact
available is still undecided in most jurisdictions. In short:
Having no integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality permits it to
be substituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on
that element becomes difficult. . . . No other formula . . . so nearly does the
work of Aladdin's lamp.41
PRIVITY
While lack of privity still remains a valid defense in cases based upon
breach of warranty except in the food cases, 42 it is no longer an issue in
actions based upon negligence and has never been a defense in a case
88 Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past
Vandermnark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 30, 59 (1965).
39 See, e.g., People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6
(1967).
4OSee Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 77 Ift. App. 2d 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1966)
where the court treated the plaintiff's assumption of risk in terms of proximate cause.
41 Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEXAs L. Rzv. 471 (1950).
42 One author has listed twenty-nine differefit theories advanced to justify an action
for breach of warranty in the sale of food by a party not in privy with the seller or
manufacturer. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nitshell, 37 OR. L. REV. 119, 153-55
(1957).
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based on strict liability.43 The liability of the manufacturer extends to the
ultimate purchaser. The Restatement 402A extends the liability to the
"ultimate user or consumer." And in Comment 1 following the section it is
said that the "consumer" need not have purchased the product at all, but
may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee, or
a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser. In addition, the
term "user" is defined to include those who are passively enjoying the
benefit of the product, as in the case of a passenger in an automobile. 4 4
Although the mere "bystander" does not fall within the Restatement defini-
tion of "user or consumer" there is authority that in some circumstances
he too is protected. 45
As to the question of who may be held liable, which looks up, rather
than down, the privity road, the Restatement 402A view permits the plain-
tiff to sue any seller who is engaged in the business of selling products,
including manufacturers, wholesale or retail dealers or distributors, and
operators of restaurants. This would not include, however, the occasional
seller or merchants who sell stock which is not a part of their usual course
of business such as the execution or bankruptcy sale. 46 Judicial decisions
have included the lessor4 7 and a real estate contractor who sold the house
with a defective product in it.4 8 But, the courts have refused to apply the
doctrine to a dentist stressing the service aspect of the business, 49 and there
48See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 617, 210 N.E.2d 182, 185 (1965),
where it is said that: "Lack of privity is not a defense in a tort action against the manu-
facturer."
44 Cases where the plaintiff purchased the defendant's product: Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168 (1964); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 In. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214
N.E.2d 347 (1966); Ilnicki v. Montgomery Ward Co., 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966);
Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Shoshone Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966). Cases where the
plaintiff was the user of the defendant's product: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) ; Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d
189 (1965); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966)
(passenger) ; Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966);
Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (Ind. 1965).
45 Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Sup. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (1965); 0. S. Stapley Co. v.
Miller, 6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 (1945) to the effect that strict liability applies
whenever the product causes injury to any "human being."
46 RESTATEMMNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f.
47 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
48 State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
49 Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967).
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is still some question as to whether it is applicable to a non-profit organiza-
tion."O
NOTICE
The Uniform Commercial Code5 carried over the requirement of "notice"
from the Uniform Sales Act.52 The provisions of both imposed a duty on
the injured consumer to give notice to the seller of any breach of warranty
within a "reasonable time." The rule was designed to protect the seller from
delayed claims which made his investigation and defense of the claim more
difficult. In actions between the immediate parties the requirement was not
unreasonable but with the advent of strict liability and the demise of privity
the parties became more remote, and until suit is filed and discovery pro-
cedures have begun the plaintiff may not know the identity of the most
probable defendant. Gradual inroads were made to scrap the requirement
by defining the term "reasonable notice" quite liberally. 53 With the recogni-
tion that the liability was tort and not contract and the conclusion that no
1(warranty" was actually involved under the doctrine of strict liability,54
the Uniform Sales Act and Uniform Commercial Code lost their influence
and the requirement of notice went the way of privity.55
RELIANCE
It is well settled that reliance upon the warranty is an essential element
in actions for breach of warranty,5" but in states which have adopted the
doctrine of strict liability, reliance is simply not an element of recovery.
50 Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132
N.W.2d 805 (1963).
51 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607 (3).
5 2 UNWORM SALES AcT § 49.
53 See, Hampton v. Gebhardt's Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1961), where
the court held that notice given after the commencement of the suit was "reasonable"
in the circumstances.
54 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 44; Vandermark v. Ford Motor
Co., supra note 44.
55 Crane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963);
Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. III. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m states that the rule is not governed by the
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act or those of the Uniform Commercial Code and,
further, that the consumer is not required to give notice to the seller of his injury within
a reasonable time after it occurs.
56 Pedrole v. Russell, 157 Cal. App. 2d 281, 320 P.2d 873 (1938); Beckett v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., supra note 1; Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305
(1943). See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra note 44; Suvada v.
1968] COMMENTS
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
DISCLAIMER
At common law the manufacturer could limit his liability for breach of
warrant by disclaimers taking the form of either a particular exclusion or
an integration clause, as an exercise of the "freedom of contract." The Uni-
form Sales Act did not contain any specific provisions dealing with disclaimers
but did sanction the use of them. 7 In the case of commercial contracts it
was thought that the experienced buyer could well protect himself against
such limitations in the use of his bargaining power; and, the injustice of
disclaimer was seldom questioned. Some courts, however, did not take such
a favorable view toward such devices and even in the case of commercial
contracts found either that the disclaimer was not brought home to the
buyer5" or that it was not applicable under the facts.5 9 The Uniform Com-
mercial Code attempted to deal with the blanket disclaimer or integration
clause, such as, "Not Warranted in Any Way," by providing that certain
implied warranties must be disclaimed by particular language.60 If strict
liability were to take the contractual form of warranty, the problem of dis-
claimers would present a thorny path; but, as already pointed out, once
privity was overcome, the tort character was obvious and provided the way
out. Even prior to the advent of strict liability it was held that a manu-
facturer could not disclaim his liability for negligence6 ' on the logic that
since the liability was not in the nature of contract, the contractual disclaimer
should have no effect. With this kind of groundwork already laid, it was
White Motor Co., supra note 43; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment
m states that the strict liability in tort rule does not require any reliance on the part
of the consumer upon the reputation, skill or judgment of the seller.
57 UNIFORM: SALES ACT § 71. See, Knecht v. Universal Motor Co., 113 N.W.2d 688
(N.D. 1962).
58 Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y. Supp. 722 (1920). Cf. Federal
Motor Truck Sales Corp. v. Shanus, 190 Minn. 5, 250 N.W. 713 (1933); Myers v.
Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1951).
59See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 831-32, where Dean
Prosser has collected decisions which refuse to permit disclaimer in the case of "breach
of contract," "failure of consideration," "implied warranty," "property damage only,"
and where goods are sold "by description."
6o Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316 provides that in order to disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantibility, the seller must mention the word "merchantibility" in the
context of the disclaimer. But the Code tempers this provision by adding that: "expres-
sions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in common understanding calls
the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty ...are exceptions to the rule." For discussion and excellent analysis
see Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 MARQ. L.
REv. 127 (1963).
61 See Ebers v. General Chem. Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945); Champlin
v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1959).
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not surprising to see the early decisions interpret strict liability as being in-
consistent with the idea of disclaimer.6 2 An Illinois court illustrated rather
astute perspective when it observed that "[t] he liability imposed . . . upon
the sellers of defective products is a strict liability in tort and is not based
upon the theory of breach of warranty. A seller, therefore, cannot protect
himself from the liability . . . by expressly negating the existence of any
implied warranties. '63 The application of the disclaimer to products liability
has apparently run out.
MISUSE
One qualification to strict products liability which traces its history to
the very beginning of the idea is that of misuse. Chief Justice Traynor in
his concurring opinion in the Escola case64 indicated that the manufacturer's
strict liability in tort should be defined in terms of the safety of the product
in normal and proper use only. Twenty years later, the landmark decision
of strict liability, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,65 noted expressly
that the plaintiff had used the defendant's product in a way in which it was
"intended to be used," and that the product was unsafe for its "intended
use."0 6 Within the framework of the defense "misuse," courts have included
ideas of "abnormal" and "unusual" use, and in discussing the latter term,
some courts have added the question of forseeability as a test of the manu-
facturer's "intended use." Where the forseeability element is applied to a
situation of mere "unusual use," courts are less likely to find that the affir-
mative defense is presented. 67 In either case, the directions or instructions
which may or may not accompany the product to the ultimate consumer
take on enormous importance in this area. And where the plaintiff departs
from explicit directions or instructions, even the mere "unusual use" which
may fall within the forseeability circle would probably constitute a bar to
recovery under the strict liability theory.68 Where the use is totally abnormal
62 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 44. But see, Greeno v. Clark Equip-
ment Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965), where the court indicates that an
exception may lie where "the total circumstances of the transaction indicate the buyer's
awareness of defects or acceptance of risk."
63 Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., supra note 44 at 30, 214 N.E.2d at 352.
6 4 Supra note 17.
6 5 Supra note 29.
66 See also Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966)
Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964)
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967).
67 See Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., supra note 66.
68See Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 214 Cal. App. 2d 340, 29 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1963);
Kaspirowitz v. Schering Corp., 70 N.J. Super. 397, 175 A.2d 658 (1961).
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under the circumstances, the plaintiff will be defeated even in the absence
of any explicit directions or instructions, such as where aspirin is taken in ex-
cessive quantities over a period of years.6 9
Another group of cases which tend to be listed under the heading of
"misuse" are those involving some "alteration" in the product's design, either
by the plaintiff himself, or someone in the chain of distribution. The idea
that the manufacturer's liability is limited to situations which involve the
product in its intended use must necessarily encompass situations of alteration
which constitute the most flagrant misuse. When the product has been
altered, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the alteration or change
had no substantial effect on the accident or injury in terms of proximate
cause.70 One such case, involving a defective ladder which the plaintiff at-
tempted to stabilize while on an unstable surface by nailing strips of wood
to the bottom of the legs (in the face of instructions not to use the product
on unstable surfaces), held that the plaintiff had not established his prima
facie case in strict liability because he failed to show that the defect
rather than the alteration was the proximate cause of his injury.71 The cases
involving "alteration" tend to attack the problem of the manufacturer's
liability in terms of proximate causation rather than in terms of the affirma-
tive defense, "misuse." Whatever their approach, courts are reluctant to
allow relief to plaintiffs who do not show proper regard for the manu-
facturer's "intended use" of his product. The social policies which deny
relief to those who contribute to their injury are beginning to emerge.
CONTRIBUTORY FAULT
In the products liability case based on the theory of "negligence," the
defendant is ordinarily given the opportunity to show that on the basis
of the plaintiff's own conduct, the right of recovery is precluded by contri-
butory negligence. 72 In some cases the plaintiff had the burden of pleading
"freedom from contributory negligence" in order to state a cause of action. 73
On the other hand, there was some confusion as to whether the defense of
contributory negligence was available under the "warranty" theory. Some
cases held that it was always a defense while others said that it was never
69 Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 52, 41 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1965);
see, Swain v. Boeing Airplane Co., 337 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1964).
700. S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 6 Ariz. App. 122, 430 P.2d 701 (1967); Martinez v.
Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966).
7' Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1966).
72 Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 193 Ill. App. 620 (1915) ; Gaw v. Lake Erie Chem-
ical Co., 293 II1. App. 123, 11 N.E.2d 982 (1937); Dixon v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
351 Ill. App. 75, 114 N.E.2d 44 (1953).
78 See, e.g., Cada v. The Fair, 187 Ill. App. 111 (1914).
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a defense, and there were an equal number on both sides. Professor Prosser
reconciled the apparent contradictions when he discovered that the cases, in
their substance, fell into a consistent pattern.
Where the negligence of the plaintiff consists only in failure to discover the danger
in the product, or to take precautions against its possible existence, it has uni-
formly been held that it is not a bar to an action for breach of warranty. [cita-
tions omitted] . . . .But if he discovers the defect, or knows the danger arising
from it, and proceeds nevertheless deliberately to encounter it by making use of
the product, his conduct is the kind of contributory negligence which overlaps as-
sumption of risk; and on either theory his recovery is barred.
74
This little reconciliation soon found its way into one of the early authorities
on the theory of strict liability: the Restatement. Following section 402A of
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it is stated in Comment n that:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard
against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contribu-
tory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to en-
counter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of
risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user
or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless
proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery.
The comment specifically noted that its position corresponds with the es-
tablished law in other strict liability fields, such as "abnormally dangerous
activities" and "animals."7 5 And thus the circle of logic, although something
less than syllogistic is complete (i.e., this is the existing law in non-product
strict liability cases as well as in products "warranty" cases, and, therefore,
it should be applied to strict products liability by analogy). Adding strong
support to the idea, the leading case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products
Inc.,70 qualified the application of strict liability to situations in which
the plaintiff "was not aware" of the defect that made the product unsafe
for its intended use.77 The great majority of cases which have since been
decided have adopted the Restatement approach almost on all fours.78
74 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 59 at 838-39.
76See PROSSER, TORTS § 78, at 538-40 (3d ed. 1964).
76 Supra note 29.
77 See also, Preston v. Up-Right Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966);
Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 66.
78 But see, Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965); 0. S.
Stapley Co., v. Miller, supra note 70; Woodrick v. Smith Gas Service Inc., 87 Ill. App.
2d 88, 230 N.E.2d 508 (1967), where the court assumed that contributory negligence was
a defense to strict products liability but decided the case on procedural grounds.
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The Illinois landmark case, Suvada v. White Motor Co., did not specifically
discuss any of the affirmative defenses available but did expressly note
that their views coincided with Restatement 402A.79 And while it is true that
the Restatement's approach is not enunciated in the section proper but rather
in the comment which follows, the language of the Illinois court, liberally
construed, implicitly includes the comment. To make matters more complex,
in actions based on theories of "negligence" or "warranty," Illinois was one
of the states which required the plaintiff to plead "freedom from contributory
negligence" or "exercise of due care."80 And in construing Suvada, the
questions centered around the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint rather
then the "nature of" the contributory fault which would lie as a defense (i.e.,
the procedural rather than the substantive questions).8 The Bua case8 2 (the
second supreme court decision handed down in Illinois) centered on a
question of discovery procedure in a strict products liability case and did
little to decide either of the questions, though some have construed it to
decide that the plaintiff still has the burden of pleading "freedom from con-
tributory negligence. '8 3
Probably the first Illinois case to address itself squarely to the question
of whether the plaintiff still has the burden of pleading "due care" was
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell,8 4 which held (interpreting Bua) that the
plaintiff does have the burden of pleading and proving freedom from con-
tributory negligence. Dunham then went on to define "contributory negli-
gence" in terms of assumption of risk by distinguishing between the failure
to discover a defect, or guard against the possibility of its existence, and
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
8oSupra note 73.
s8 Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966); General
Motors v. Bua, 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1962). See Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg.
Co., 77 Ill. App. 2d 374, 222 N.E.2d 348 (1966) (another decision which avoided the
discussion by displacing the real issue with the Aladdin's lamp, "proximate cause").
82 General Motors v. Bua, supra note 81.
83 Headnote 7 of the Northeastern Reporter interprets the case as holding that in a
strict liability case, the plaintiff must prove that he was in the exercise of due care for
his own safety from the following language: "This is a products liability case pleaded in
two counts, one alleging negligence, and the other alleging breach of warranty. In
Suvada v. White [citation omitted] this court adopted the theory which imposes strict
tort liability on the manufacturer. Under that theory, negligence need not be proved
and a plaintiff has only to prove that his injury or damages resulted from a condition of
the product, that the condition was an unusually dangerous one, and that the condition
existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control. However, under both
counts it is necessary to prove that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his
own safety." (emphasis supplied). 37 Ill. 2d 180, 187, 226 N.E.2d 6, 13 (1965). It is diffi-
cult (understatement) to understand how this language could have been so interpreted.
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 II1. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1967).
84 Supra note 83.
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the actual use of the product after the defect or danger is known. It is not
surprising that the court couched their decision in the label of "contributory
negligence" rather than "assumption of risk," since Illinois had traditionally
confined the doctrine of assumption of risk to master-servant and contractual
relationships, 5 and instant change is seldom ever favored.
The following year two appellate courts, in separate districts, attacked
the problem courageously and rendered similar decisions within the same
month, apparently without the benefit of each other's opinion.
The Sweeney case8 6 arose out of the defective nails which, when hit prop-
erly, broke off and flew like bullets, one into the plaintiff's eye. In deciding
that "assumption of risk" is a defense to strict products liability, the court
distinguished the case at bar from established precedent on the issue by
noting that the existing case law, which restricted the application of the de-
fense, was grounded in negligence whereas strict liability is a tort action not
based on negligence. As to whether the plaintiff had the burden to plead and
prove "due care," the court hedged its decision around the confusion flowing
from the Bua decision,8 7 saying in effect that if the supreme court has de-
cided that the plaintiff has the duty of pleading "due care" they meant only
that he must not have voluntarily exposed himself to a recognized risk. The
court did not decide whether the defense of assumption of risk was an affirma-
tive one or not.
Less than two weeks after Sweeney, another appellate court handed down
its decision in the Williams case,88 which arose out of a "defective" trenching
machine which bucked like a bronco and ran over the plaintiff. The question
addressed by the court was whether the plaintiff was required to plead and
prove "due care" and what was the nature of the due care which would bar
the action. In clearing the brush, the court construed the Bua decision to
have decided only that contributory negligence is a proper issue in a strict
liability case. Then the court decided that contributory negligence was in fact
an affirmative defense (i.e., the burdens of pleading and proof are on the
defendant) and defined "contributory negligence" saying:
For purposes of this opinion contributory negligence is defined as volountarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger or proceeding unrea-
sonably to make use of a product after discovery of a defect and becoming aware
of the danger.8 9
85 Camp Point Mfg. Co. v. Ballou, 71 Ill. 417 (1874); Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes,
133 Ill. 255, 24 N.E. 563 (1890); Chicago & E.I.R.R. Co. v. Randolph, 199 Ill. 126, 65
N.E. 142 (1902). But see, Brownback v. Thomas, 101 Ill. App. 81 (1902).
86 Sweeney v. A. R. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 236 N.E.2d 439 (1968).
87 General Motors v. Bua, supra note 81.
8 8 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 91 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 12U5 (1968).
89 Id. at 133, 236 N.E.2d 125 at 133.
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As the opinion continued, the court dropped the use of the words "contribu-
tory negligence" and spoke in terms of "contributory fault," which seems to
be a more appropriate phrase especially when one stops to consider that negli-
gence is the antithesis of strict liability9 ° and that negligence law has no
place in the field of strict liability.
The Sweeney and Williams decisions finally established some definite
authority on the issue of pleading and proof of contributory fault, and, for
a little over one week, things were tranquil. And then, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting in a diversity case and
applying Illinois law, interpreted the Bua case quite another way, saying:
"The Supreme Court of Illinois has now made it clear,91 in People v. Bua that
plaintiff must prove in a products liability case that he "was in the exercise
of due care for his own safety.' "92 Moreover, the court did not distinguish
between the standard of "due care" in negligence cases and the standard of
"due care" in strict liability cases but seemed to lump them together, thereby
implying that they are the same. It is apparent that the court was not
operating under the insight of the Sweeney and Brown cases; and it is rea-
sonable to assume that in applying Illinois law the federal courts will most
probably treat the Dasenko case as little precedent.
It is almost clear at this point that the courts intend to distinguish between
the standards applicable to negligence law and those which are applicable
in cases of strict products liability. In defining the nature of the particular
contributory fault which will lie as an affirmative defense to the latter, courts
have somewhat loosely referred to the doctrine of assumption of risk, when
in fact they meant a particular type of contributory fault which also lies as
a defense to a negligence action (i.e., contributory negligence). While con-
tributory negligence per se is not a defense to strict products liability, the
particular contributory fault which would constitute such a defense over-
laps the doctrine of contributory negligence and is a narrow form of it. In
substance, the courts have all defined the nature of the defense as "volun-
tarily and unreasonably encountering a known danger,"9 9 which conduct
would certainly comprise a form of contributory negligence. The difference
between the two doctrines is simply one of breadth. The idea of comparative
fault is much more narrow than the doctrine of contributory negligence. The
former is concerned with the subjective standard of conduct, (requiring that
the plaintiff have actual knowledge of the risk or danger), and the latter
90 Suvada v. White Motor Co., supra note 44.
91 The only clarity is the headnote contained in the regional reporter which doesn't
seem to be supported by the substance of the case. See note 83.
92 Dazenko v. James Hunter Machine Co., 393 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
9$Supra notes 86, 88.
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is concerned with an objective standard (requiring only the knowledge that
a reasonably prudent man would have). This is as far as the courts have
gone in defining the particular characteristics of the affirmative defense, con-
tributory fault, and perhaps marks the high waterline of definition.94 In
either case, there appears to be good reasons not to adopt the term "as-
sumption of risk" which would necessarily confuse and unduly restrict the
development of the concept of strict liability,95 which should have the
freedom to develop in the environment which created it.
While disclaimers may not have a place in the field of strict products
liability, perhaps the "warning" will replace them. Manufacturers, many of
whom are either self-insured, or retrospectively rated, will doubtlessly at-
tempt to insulate themselves from products claims by placing comprehensive
warnings on their products in an effort to come within the ambit of contri-
butory fault. Almost all of the decisions which have dealt with the question
of the sufficiency of the warnings decided before the defense of contributory
fault was judiciously established and were concerned with the problem of
"defect" rather than the affirmative defense under discussion. In those
cases, the failure to warn comprised the unreasonably dangerous condition
or "defect" 96 because the courts found that in certain circumstances the
defendant had a "duty to warn." These cases are little help in analyzing the
sufficiency of warnings in their relationship to contributory fault and within
the standard of the subjective test. This, however, does not leave us without
some precedent.
The Brown case97 involved an instruction manual which, if read and heeded,
probably could have prevented the plaintiff's injury. Though the plaintiff
admitted reading the instructions (although they were contained in a
booklet not attached to the product), the court held that, because they did
not contain a specific warning of the particular danger which would result
from a failure to heed the instructions( the evidence could not support a
finding that the plaintiff unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known
danger. Further, the court suggested that the warning should have been
placed on the machine itself.98 It might be concluded that the warning
94 Supra notes 86, 88.
95 Professor Prosser recognizes three senses of the term "assumption of risk," PROSSER,
TORTS § 67 (3d ed. 1964). The Restatement adds a fourth sense of interpretation or
usage, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 496A (1964). Professor Keeton recognizes not
less than six senses in which the term may be properly used, Keeton, Assumption of
Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961).
98 See, Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963);
Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965) ; Kirby
v. General Paving Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 453, 229 N.E.2d 777 (1967).
97 Supra note 88.
98 See, McKay v. Upson-Walton Co., 317 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1963).
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necessary to impute some contributory fault to the plaintiff is one which is
calculated to reach the ultimate user and which includes specifically the
particular danger involved. As a caveat, the warning should not be so all in-
clusive so as to preclude the user from reading it.99
As to the standard of subjectivity, the plaintiff in the Sweeney caseo ° °
testified, in effect, that the thought entered his mind that either he was doing
something wrong or that something was wrong with the nails themselves,
but this evidence was insufficient to justify a directed verdict against him.
The court pointed out the inexperience of the plaintiff, stressed the total
circumstances of the transaction, and submitted the question of contributory
fault to the jury. While it is true that the experience or expertise of the
plaintiff should be considered in determining the plaintiff's state of mind in
a subjective sense, one questions whether it is a proper determinant where
the plaintiff has, in effect, admitted having knowledge.
How much kowledge is required? Is the issue of whether the plaintiff ap-
preciates the risk related to the degree of obviousness of the danger or are
there no objective standards? Doesn't the plaintiff already have the best of
all possible worlds? The answers to these questions lie in tomorrow's develop-
ment.
CONCLUSION
We have traveled a long way from the day of the Winterbottom rationale
when people felt that there was some justification for liability based upon
principles of fault. The scales of justice are being balanced in favor of
the injured and many times crippled plaintiff. At the same time the manu-
facturer and his insurer are looking down both barrels. Perhaps the courts
are really laying the groundwork for "products compensation" which may
or may not surprise you. For a long time in the field of personal injury the
formula for liability has been: injury + insurance = liability. How did the
manufacturers escape this for such a long time? Was it ever fashionable to
be illiberal?
Paul Episcope
99 See, Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra note 96 at 858, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 at 757.
10OSuira note 86.
